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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 The principal issue presented on this appeal is whether 
a court may consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) – “the seriousness of the offense, . . . respect 
for the law, and . . . just punishment for the offense” – when 
imposing a sentence for the violation of the conditions of 
supervised release.  Concluding that a court is not prohibited 
from considering the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in the 
supervised release revocation context, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment. 
 
3 
 
 
I. 
 From December 4, 2003 to September 7, 2005, 
Appellant Joseph Young went on a forged-check-cashing 
spree, enlisting the assistance of several individuals to present 
bogus checks in exchange for a share of the proceeds.  On 
September 22, 2005, he was sentenced in the Cambria County 
Court of Common Pleas on twenty separate charging 
instruments.  The sentence on one of the charging instruments 
included a prison term of thirty to sixty months, which was 
later reduced to 273 days to twenty-four months, less one day.  
He was released on parole on February 13, 2006. 
 Undeterred by the criminal justice sanctions imposed 
and the fact that he was under the supervision of state parole 
and probation authorities, Young quickly reverted to passing 
counterfeit checks.  On July 8, 2006, Young, with the aid of 
Jeanne Hooter, unsuccessfully attempted to pass a counterfeit 
check at a JC Penney department store at the Pittsburgh Mills 
Mall.  This incident garnered the attention of federal law 
enforcement authorities.  On April 17, 2007, Young and 
Hooter were indicted on a charge of conspiracy to make, 
utter, and possess counterfeit securities of an organization 
involved in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371.  On October 16, 2007, Young entered a plea of guilty 
to the conspiracy count pursuant to a written agreement.  The 
plea agreement included several stipulations concerning such 
matters as the amount of loss and acceptance of 
responsibility.  The parties further stipulated that “no other 
enhancements or reductions in the offense level apply.”  (A. 
50-4.)  The plea agreement also included an appeal and 
collateral challenge waiver.  
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 As a result of the parties’ stipulations, Young’s 
conduct resulted in an offense level of eight.  Young’s prior 
criminal history netted sixteen points, placing him in criminal 
history category VI.  Young’s resulting advisory guideline 
range for imprisonment was eighteen to twenty-four months.1
 Young commenced his supervised release term at the 
end of September 2008.  He made his initial report to the 
Probation Office in the Western District of Pennsylvania on 
October 10, 2008.  At that time, he tested positive for use of 
cocaine and acknowledged having used cocaine the prior day.  
The Probation Office recommended that no action be taken 
 
 Young’s sentencing proceeding convened on February 
22, 2008.  Young did not object to any of the factual findings 
presented in the PSR.  After considering all the pertinent 
factors, the District Court imposed a prison term of twenty-
four months, restitution in the amount of $384.74, and a 
supervised release term of three years.  Among the conditions 
of supervised release, Young was not to commit another 
federal, state, or local crime, and was to refrain from the 
possession or use of any controlled substance. 
                                              
1 According to the Presentence Investigation Report 
(“PSR”), but for the parties’ stipulations, Young would have 
received an offense enhancement of two levels for use of an 
access device, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B)(i), and 
two additional levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for his role as 
a leader.  Inclusion of these offense level adjustments would 
have resulted in an advisory guideline range of thirty to 
thirty-seven months’ imprisonment. 
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based upon the admitted use of cocaine, and the District Court 
concurred with the recommendation. 
 On November 6, 2008, less than one month after 
supervision commenced, Young was arrested in Blair County, 
Pennsylvania, on charges of forgery, escape, resisting arrest, 
false reports to law enforcement, and false identification to 
law enforcement.  On November 24, 2008, the District Court 
ordered that a bench warrant be issued for Young’s arrest for 
violation of the terms of supervised release, with the warrant 
to be lodged as a detainer at the Blair County Prison. 
 Disposition of the supervised release violations was 
deferred pending the outcome of the state charges in Blair 
County.  Young was sentenced by the state court to a prison 
term of ten to twenty-three and one-half months.  Upon his 
parole from the state sentence, Young was taken into federal 
custody to answer for the violation of the terms and 
conditions of supervised release. 
 Young’s supervised release revocation proceeding 
convened on January 29, 2010.  Young acknowledged 
violating the terms and conditions of supervised release based 
upon the state court conviction.  Finding that Young’s 
conduct constituted a  “Grade B” violation, the District Court, 
in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1), revoked Young’s 
supervised release.  Young’s advisory guideline 
imprisonment range was determined to be twenty-one to 
twenty-seven months.  See id. § 7B1.4(a).  Because, however, 
Young’s original federal conviction was classified as a Class 
D felony, the statutory maximum term of imprisonment was 
twenty-four months.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 
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 Acknowledging that the guideline range was advisory 
only, the District Court afforded defense counsel ample 
opportunity to substantiate Young’s request for a prison term 
well below the advisory guideline range.  Defense counsel 
urged that Young’s latest encounter with the criminal justice 
system was the product of his substance abuse problems.  
Young also presented evidence that four persons in the local 
community, including a Magisterial District Judge, were 
willing to provide assistance to him. 
 The government recommended a prison term of 
twenty-four months, without any period of supervised release 
to follow.  The government argued that such a sentence was 
necessary in view of Young’s recidivism and continued drug 
use.  The government also asserted that restitution had been 
made by his co-defendant, Jeanne Hooter, and not by Young.  
In conclusion, the government argued that a sentence of 
twenty-four months would at least safeguard the public for 
that period of time. 
 In rebuttal, defense counsel argued that a prison term 
of twenty-four months would not advance any of the 
applicable sentencing factors and would ignore the substantial 
role that Young’s substance abuse problems played in his 
criminal history.  Defense counsel also emphasized that 
Young had the support of four prominent members of the 
community, and argued that Young and society would be 
better served by placing Young on supervision. 
 Ultimately, the District Court decided to impose a 
prison term of twenty-four months, to be followed by a 
twelve-month term of supervised release.  In explaining its 
rationale for the sentence, the District Court stated: 
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 Now, in making the factual findings 
relevant to your sentence, I did give meaningful 
consideration to the factors set out under Title 
18, United States Code, Section 3553(a).  And 
here, you clearly violated the terms of your 
supervised release, there’s no question about 
that.  You committed these crimes not more 
than six weeks after your release from custody.  
And once again, you were back using cocaine. 
 And as you and I well know, . . . you 
have a very long history, despite the fact that it 
doesn’t go back that many years in terms of 
chronology.  And you’ve been involved with 
forging documents, and bad checks, and altering 
ID’s.  And a lot of this stems from cocaine and 
alcohol addiction. 
 But the other thing that bothered me 
when I sentenced you initially was it was my 
sense, and it’s still my sense, that you preyed on 
others relative to cocaine and alcohol 
addictions.  And so that was something else that 
was troubling to this Court. 
 I also have to try to deter you from future 
criminal conduct, and I’m concerned that even 
with these four friends of yours who stood up 
and tried to cover your back, and your mom and 
your brother, you had some of these resources 
available to you when you got out the last time, 
and within six weeks you were out doing crimes 
again.  And you tell me, and everyone else tells 
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me, you need drug and alcohol counseling 
treatment. . . . 
 As also [has] been pointed out, the 
restitution has been paid, but . . . it was the co-
defendant who [made] the payment. . . .  
 So, considering all of these factors, Mr. 
Young, and considering the fact that you’re 
[sic] criminal history was remarkable, and 
usually it was the same behavior, and it was 
spread over various counts, despite the fact that 
you had a college education, the job skills, at 
one time you owned your own business, that 
you went right back out and broke the law 
again.  So, I’m not sure, you know, whether 
supervision in and of itself, or probation in and 
of itself, or anything else would stop you from 
doing what you’ve done in the past, unless you 
have been, in my estimation, treated and 
corrected. 
 So, I believe that the sentence [of 
twenty-four months’ imprisonment] . . . meets 
the sentencing objectives by reflecting the 
seriousness of the violations, promoting respect 
for the law, and providing just punishment. 
(A. 149-150.) 
 After the sentence was pronounced, Young, through 
his counsel, objected on the grounds that the District Court (a) 
had improperly taken into consideration the § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
factors; (b) did not have a proper evidentiary foundation for 
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its finding that Young had preyed on other people; (c) had 
erred in finding that co-defendant Hooter had paid restitution, 
when, in fact, it was Young’s mother who had given the 
money to Hooter to make restitution; and (d) failed to give 
adequate weight to mitigation factors and rehabilitation 
needs.  The District Court rejected Young’s renewed entreaty 
for a lesser sentence.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction by virtue of 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  Our standard of review in 
the context presented here was recently articulated as follows: 
 This Court reviews the procedural and 
substantive reasonableness of a district court’s 
sentence upon revocation of supervised release 
for abuse of discretion.  Procedurally, the 
sentencing court must give “rational and 
meaningful consideration” to the relevant 
§ 3553(a) factors. Where procedural 
reasonableness turns on a question of statutory 
interpretation, we conduct plenary review of the 
meaning of the statute.  If a sentencing court 
followed the appropriate procedures in 
imposing the sentence, we then look to whether 
the sentence itself was substantively reasonable.  
Substantive reasonableness inquires into 
“whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie 
within the permissible statutory range, was 
premised upon appropriate and judicious 
consideration of the relevant factors.”  Absent 
procedural error, we will affirm the sentencing 
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court “unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.” 
United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769-70 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted). 
III. 
 Young argues that the District Court committed three 
procedural errors that combined to result in a substantively 
unreasonable sentence.  Specifically, Young contends that the 
District Court was precluded from imposing a sentence that, 
in the District Court’s words, “meets the sentencing 
objectives by reflecting the seriousness of the violations, 
promoting respect for the law, and providing just 
punishment.”  (A. 150.)  The second procedural error posited 
by Young concerns the District Court’s findings that Young 
appeared to have a proclivity to prey on alcoholics and drug 
addicts to facilitate the negotiation of bogus checks and had 
not satisfied his restitution obligation.  The final asserted 
procedural error is the District Court’s purported failure “to 
give meaningful consideration to defense arguments and a 
proposal for rehabilitation.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 15.)  Each 
alleged procedural error will be considered in turn. 
A. 
 Young contends that his sentence is procedurally 
unreasonable because Congress has precluded consideration 
of the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in the context of a supervised 
release revocation proceeding.  Young’s argument presents a 
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question of statutory interpretation, over which our review is 
plenary.  See Doe, 617 F.3d at 769-70.  
 Revocation of supervised release is governed by 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e), which, in pertinent part, provides: 
The court may, after considering the factors set 
forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), 
(a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7) –  
. . . . 
(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and 
require the defendant to serve in prison all or 
part of the term of supervised release authorized 
by statute for the offense that resulted in such 
term of supervised release without credit for 
time previously served on postrelease 
supervision, if the court . . . finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant violated a condition of supervised 
release . . . . 
Young argues that because § 3553(a)(2)(A) is not one of the 
sentencing factors listed in § 3583(e), the District Court 
committed reversible error by mentioning the seriousness of 
the violation, along with the need to promote respect for the 
law and to provide just punishment, in the rationale for its 
sentence. 
 We have not previously addressed the precise question 
presented here.  We have, however, suggested that 
consideration of the gravity of the violation of supervised 
release – a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor – is not prohibited.  See 
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United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(“Sentence is imposed for violations of supervised release 
primarily to sanction the defendant’s breach of trust while 
taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the 
underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.” 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  In 
Bungar, we also acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit has held that the omission of 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) from § 3583(e) “does not foreclose a court 
from considering ‘other pertinent factors,’ such as the need 
for the sentence to reflect ‘the seriousness of the offense.’”  
Id. at 543 n.2 (quoting United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 
47-48 (2d Cir. 2006)).  The Sixth Circuit subsequently agreed 
with the holding in Williams.  See United States v. Lewis, 498 
F.3d 393, 399-400 (6th Cir. 2007).  We now confront directly 
the question of whether consideration of the § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
factors in the revocation context is prohibited, and join the 
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Sixth Circuits in 
holding that a district court does not commit procedural error 
in taking into account those factors when imposing a sentence 
for the violation of supervised release. 
 As the Second Circuit explained in Williams, the 
enumeration in § 3583(e) of specified subsections of 
§ 3553(a) that a court must consider in revoking supervised 
release does not mean that it may not take into account any 
other pertinent factor.  443 F.3d at 47.  Furthermore, because 
a court, in revoking supervised release, must take into 
consideration “the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), as well as “the need for the sentence 
imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and “to protect the public from 
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further crimes of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), 
“§ 3583(e) cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude 
consideration of the seriousness of the releasee’s violation,”  
Williams, 443 F.3d at 48.  Indeed, the “nature and 
circumstances of the offense,” a mandatory revocation 
consideration under § 3583(e), necessarily encompasses the 
seriousness of the violation of supervised release. 
 In Lewis, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the omission of 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) from § 3583(e) does not foreclose 
consideration of the factors listed in the former section, and 
that the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors are “essentially redundant 
with matters courts are already permitted to take into 
consideration when imposing sentences for violation of 
supervised release.”  498 F.3d at 400.  The Sixth Circuit 
found additional support for its conclusion in United States 
Sentencing Commission policy statements.  Writing for the 
court, Judge McKeague explained: 
[I]n the official introduction to the policy 
statements regarding supervised release, the 
Sentencing Commission explains that “the 
sentence imposed upon revocation . . . [is] 
intended to sanction the violator for failing to 
abide by the conditions of the court-ordered 
supervision.” Thus, although violations of 
supervised release generally do not entail 
conduct as serious as crimes punishable under 
the § 3553(a) regime, revocation sentences are 
similarly intended to “sanction,” or, 
analogously, to “provide just punishment for the 
offense” of violating supervised release. Given 
that the three considerations in § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
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are consistent with considerations already 
permissible for revocation sentences, the fact 
that § 3583(e) does not require that courts 
consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) does not mean that 
courts are forbidden to consider that factor, and 
the fact that a sentencing court does consider 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) is not error.  
Id. (citation omitted). 
 Young relies upon case law from the Ninth Circuit to 
support his contention that the District Court in his case was 
prohibited from taking into account the § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
factors.  (Appellant’s Br. at 17-18 (citing United States v. 
Hammons, 558 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009)).)  In 
Hammons, which involved a district court’s complete failure 
to provide any reasons for the defendant’s sentence upon 
revocation of supervised release, the Ninth Circuit observed 
that a district court is not to consider the § 3553(a)(2)(A) 
factors, citing United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1181-
82 (9th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 
1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007).  Hammons, 558 F.3d at 1104.  
Miqbel reasoned that because “§ 3553(a)(2)(A) is a factor that 
Congress deliberately omitted from the list applicable to 
revocation sentencing, relying on that factor when imposing a 
revocation sentence would be improper.”2
                                              
2 Miqbel did not cite Williams, which was decided on 
March 22, 2006, less than one month before the decision in 
Miqbel was issued. 
  444 F.3d at 1182.  
Significantly, however, the court in Miqbel went on to state 
that it would be unreasonable for a district court to place 
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“primary” reliance upon a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor, stating that 
“[w]e do not suggest that a mere reference to promoting 
respect for the law would in itself render a sentence 
unreasonable.”  Id. 
 Buttressing the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit did 
not make reliance upon a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor improper per 
se is the rationale articulated in Simtob.  Explaining the 
limited nature of its holding in Miqbel, the court in Simtob 
wrote: 
[W]e did not set forth a blanket proposition that 
a court in no circumstances may consider the 
seriousness of the criminal offense underlying 
the revocation.  The seriousness of the offense 
underlying the revocation, though not a focal 
point of the inquiry, may be considered to a 
lesser degree as part of the criminal history of 
the violator. . . . 
 To ignore the new violation underlying 
the revocation entirely would be to ignore a key 
predictor of a violator’s potential for 
reintroduction into society without relapse. The 
history of the violator, when combined with the 
violator’s most recent criminal offenses, and 
particularly when similar to the past 
transgressions, is indicative of the violator’s 
propensity for recidivism and inability to 
integrate peacefully into a community. A 
history of, for example, drug-related offenses, 
combined with a drug-related offense 
underlying the revocation, as is the case here, 
creates a greater likelihood that the violator will 
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relapse into the same or similar criminal 
activity. A violator who, after committing an 
offense and being placed on supervised release 
for that offense, again commits a similar offense 
is not only more likely to continue on that path, 
but also has demonstrated to the court that the 
violator has little respect for its command. 
Because the district court’s trust in the 
violator’s ability to coexist in society peacefully 
has been broken to a greater degree than if the 
violator had committed a minor offense of a 
dissimilar nature, greater sanctions may be 
required to deter future criminal activity.  
Consequently, if the nature and the severity of 
the underlying offense were removed from the 
equation altogether, the court’s ability to 
predict the violator’s potential for recidivism 
and to punish the violator for the violator’s full 
breach of trust (and, ultimately, to deter the 
violator and to protect the public) would be 
impaired significantly. 
Simtob, 485 F.3d at 1062-63 (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
 The Ninth Circuit’s explication in Simtob is consistent 
with the reasoning articulated by the Second Circuit in 
Williams and the Sixth Circuit in Lewis:  the mere omission of 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) from the mandatory supervised release 
revocation considerations in § 3583(e) does not preclude a 
court from taking into account the seriousness of the conduct 
underlying the supervised release revocation or the need for 
the resulting sentence to promote respect for the law and 
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provide just punishment.  To hold otherwise would ignore the 
reality that the violator’s conduct simply cannot be 
disregarded in determining the appropriate sanction.  Indeed, 
the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines take 
into account the seriousness of the violation of supervised 
release by setting lengthier guideline ranges for offenses 
classified as more serious.  See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4.  Thus, for 
example, had Young’s conduct been classified as a less 
serious “Grade C” violation, his advisory guideline 
imprisonment range would have been eight to fourteen 
months, as opposed to twenty-one to twenty-seven months for 
the Grade B violation for which he was accountable.3
                                              
3 The Fourth Circuit has stated “[a]ccording to 
§ 3583(e), in devising a revocation sentence the district court 
is not authorized to consider whether the revocation sentence 
‘reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense, . . . promote[s] 
respect for the law, and . . . provide[s] just punishment for the 
offense.”  United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)).  As pointed 
out by the Government, the Fourth Circuit made this 
observation without citation to Williams or any other 
authority.  (Appellee’s Br. at 25.)  Moreover, the Fourth 
Circuit’s statement was not supported by any analysis.  
Finally, subsequent holdings of the Fourth Circuit, albeit non-
precedential, have sustained revocation sentences even where 
a district court has cited in support of the sentence the “need 
to provide just punishment,” United States v. Jennette, 324 F. 
App’x 279, 280 (4th Cir. 2009); promote respect for the law, 
United States v. Black, 289 F. App’x 613, 615 (4th Cir. 
2008); and the seriousness of the defendant’s supervised 
release violation, United States v. Turner, 241 F. App’x 168, 
  Id. 
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 It is thus plain to us that a district court’s consideration 
of, and explicit reference to, the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in 
imposing a sentence for the violation of supervised release is 
not a procedural error that renders the sentence per se 
unreasonable.  Of course, there may be a case where a court 
places undue weight on the seriousness of the violation or the 
need for the sentence to promote respect for the law and 
provide just punishment.  But this is not such a case.   
 Unlike Williams, in which the Second Circuit affirmed 
a sentence above the advisory guideline range 
notwithstanding the district court’s explicit reliance upon the 
seriousness of the violation, the District Court’s sentence in 
this case fell within the advisory guideline range.  As noted 
above, the guideline range takes into consideration the 
seriousness of the offense, and we find it difficult to conceive 
a scenario where a district court’s reference to a particular 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factor would render a within-guideline range 
sentence unreasonable per se.  Furthermore, it is evident that 
the District Court in this case was motivated to sanction the 
repeated breaches of trust that occurred so soon after Young’s 
release from custody.  As noted above, the primary purpose 
of a sentence for the violation of supervised release is “to 
sanction the defendant’s breach of trust.”  Bungar, 478 F.3d 
at 544.  In this regard, the District Court commented on the 
fact that Young breached the trust reposed in him despite the 
                                                                                                     
171 (4th Cir. 2007).  It thus appears that the Fourth Circuit 
has acknowledged that the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors are 
inextricably intertwined with other factors, such as the nature 
and circumstances of the offense, that a court must consider 
in determining the appropriate sanction for a supervised 
release violation. 
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existence of a supportive family and his educational and 
vocational advantages.  The District Court also appropriately 
considered the need to provide deterrence and to protect the 
public from further criminal conduct by Young, observing 
that he engaged in the same type of criminal conduct that 
resulted in the offense of conviction within weeks of his 
release.  We have recognized that criminal activity of the 
same sort underlying the offense of conviction shortly after 
the defendant’s discharge from custody “surely bespeak[s] a 
breach of trust.”  United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 
894 (3d Cir. 1991).  We have also acknowledged that a 
defendant’s immediate return to a past pattern of criminal 
conduct, as is the case here, “showed . . .  that he continued to 
pose a threat to the community,” a pertinent sentencing 
consideration under § 3583(e).  See Bungar, 478 F.3d at 546.  
It is thus evident that the District Court’s concluding 
observation that the sentence of twenty-four months’ 
imprisonment “meets the sentencing objectives by reflecting 
the seriousness of the violations, promoting respect for the 
law, and providing just punishment” (A. 150), did not reflect 
undue reliance upon the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors.  
Accordingly, Young is not entitled to relief simply because 
the District Court took into account those factors in imposing 
its sentence. 
B. 
 Young contends that the District Court committed 
procedural error by finding that Young’s criminal conduct 
involved his preying on others when there was no evidence 
presented at the revocation hearing to support such a 
conclusion.  Young further argues that “the [D]istrict [C]ourt 
improperly drew on unreliable information from another 
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hearing involving a co-defendant, where neither Mr. Young 
or his counsel were present.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 19.)  
Young’s assertion is mistaken.   
 At the sentencing proceeding on his original federal 
conviction, the District Court observed that Young had 
preyed on vulnerable addicts and alcoholics by having them 
present bogus checks in exchange for a share of the proceeds.  
There was ample support for this conclusion in the factual 
findings set forth in the PSR, and Young did not object to 
those findings.  In fashioning the revocation sanction, the 
District Court was required to consider “the history and 
characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and 
it was not error for the District Court to consider Young’s 
“history and characteristics” as revealed in the PSR that was 
considered at a sentencing proceeding conducted less than 
two years before the revocation hearing. 
 Young also complains that the District Court faulted 
him for having had his mother pay the restitution of $384.74.  
Young contends that there was no evidentiary support for the 
District Court’s observation that Young “should have been 
able to come up with the wherewithal [to make restitution], 
even in prison.”  (A. 157.) 
 As the Government points out, the District Court’s 
statements about restitution must be placed in context.  The 
District Court initially understood that Young himself had 
satisfied the restitution obligation.  Satisfaction of a 
restitution obligation implies acceptance of responsibility for 
the underlying crime.  That Young’s mother paid the very 
modest restitution obligation of a 53-year-old college-
educated person implies a failure on Young’s part to take 
responsibility for his actions.  The District Court was entitled 
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to take this factor into account in determining the appropriate 
sanction for the supervised release violation, and committed 
no error in observing that it was troubled by the fact that 
Young had not made any effort to make restitution on his 
own. 
C. 
 Young’s final claim of procedural error is that the 
District Court failed to give meaningful consideration to 
mitigation factors.  Specifically, Young asserts that the 
District Court failed to take into account the substance abuse 
component of Young’s criminal conduct and the support 
offered by Young’s friends and family. 
 A defendant, of course, is entitled to meaningful 
consideration of the pertinent sentencing factors.  See United 
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006), 
abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 
552 U.S. 85 (2007).  But the record need not show that every 
argument advanced on behalf of the defendant was addressed.  
Id.  All that is required is that “the record makes clear the 
court took the [pertinent] factors into account in sentencing.”  
Id. 
 In this case, the record demonstrates that the District 
Court did give meaningful consideration to the mitigation 
factors advanced by Young.  First, the District Court 
acknowledged the role that substance abuse problems had 
played in Young’s criminal conduct.  In fact, it recommended 
to the Bureau of Prisons that Young be placed in any 
substance abuse program for which he qualified.  Second, the 
District Court recognized that friends had pledged to assist 
and support Young to avoid a repetition of his substance 
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abuse and related criminal conduct.  None of the persons who 
came forward to offer assistance, however, had experience 
working with addicts.  The District Court also noted that 
Young had similar support when he was discharged from 
custody, but reverted to drug use and criminal conduct as 
soon as he left prison. 
 The District Court’s statements evince deliberate and 
careful consideration of Young’s arguments.  The District 
Court’s decision to accord less weight to mitigation factors 
than that urged by Young does not render the sentence 
unreasonable.  See Bungar, 478 F.3d at 546. 
IV. 
 Young’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of 
his sentence is premised upon alleged procedural errors.  We 
have concluded, however, that Young has failed to show that 
the District Court committed any procedural error in 
sentencing him to a prison term of twenty-four months plus a 
supervised release term of one year.  It necessarily follows, 
therefore, that the substantive challenge to his sentence fails 
as well.  Indeed, it cannot be said in this case that “no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on [Young] for the reasons the district court 
provided.”  Doe, 617 F.3d at 770 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
